


STAT



Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

25X1 TOP SECRET

27 November 1964

Copy No. C

*Ed. 2*



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Dept. review completed

25X1

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

27 November 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS


1. Congo: Rebels continue to pose a considerable threat to government forces. (Page 1)
2. South Vietnam: Huong government's future increasingly uncertain. (Page 3)
3. Communist World: Peiping and Moscow reaffirm their support for North Vietnam. (Page 4)

25X1

25X1

6. Notes: [REDACTED] UN; USSR; Cuba. (Page 7)

25X1



25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 November 1964

## DAILY BRIEF

\*Congo: (Information as of 0400 EST) The Congolese rebels though badly disrupted by the attack on Stanleyville continue to resist there and elsewhere, and still pose a considerable threat to government forces.

The Van der Walle force is running into more resistance than anticipated in Stanleyville and is not expected to be able to make a major move outside the city for some days. Large numbers of rebels are reported around the city, particularly on the south bank of the Congo River. Belgian paratroops met with heavy resistance in Paulis and large numbers of the rebels are believed to remain in the city and to the northeast where government forces have not penetrated.

In the south, the rebels in the wake of Van der Walle's advance are reported to have retaken Punia and they appear to have gained the upper hand in the Uvira-Kindu-Albertville triangle.

No rebel leaders have yet been captured. They may still succeed in regrouping and in getting stepped-up outside assistance. The Belgian chargé in Dar es Salaam has a report, as yet unconfirmed, that an Algerian IL-18 has made two new arms deliveries at Arua in northwest Uganda. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] a railroad car loaded with Chinese Communist ammunition consigned to Burundi left Dar es Salaam on 24-25 November via Kigoma, Tanganyika. A 12.7 mm machine gun of Chinese Communist manufacture was recently found in Stanleyville.

25X1

(continued)

The Belgian paratroop unit which carried out the drops on Stanleyville and Paulis will probably begin its withdrawal shortly.

Reaction to the Belgian paradrops is becoming increasingly strident in Africa. All the radical states have joined in a chorus of "aggression" and demanded that the "imperialists" withdraw. Most other African states are highly critical of the move and refuse to grant a humanitarian purpose.

Anti-US and anti-Belgian demonstrations involving damage to installations and property have occurred in Cairo, Khartoum, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Mogadiscio, and others, including Brazzaville, are almost certain. In Cairo, in an assault clearly condoned by UAR authorities, a mob of Africans burned the USIS library and Marine guard building, and just failed in a frontal assault on the US Embassy Chancery. In Kenya, the demonstrators called for "armed intervention" by the OAU.

Ben Bella told an Algerian crowd that "we will send arms and volunteers to our Congolese brothers, like we already have." Sekou Toure of Guinea said that Tshombe was now "absolutely finished" in Africa and all Africa would now support the "nationalists." President Nyerere of Tanzania said the Western action was taken in disregard for negotiations underway, and "in defiance of the whole of Africa."

Somalia, while chastising the OAU Ad Hoc Commission on the Congo for "acting beyond its terms of reference," strongly condemned the invasion and called for an emergency meeting of African foreign ministers.

Other demonstrations occurred in Sofia and Prague. In Sofia, Bulgarians joined African and other foreign students. In Prague, apparently only African students were involved in the demonstrations.

25X1

25X1

South Vietnam: Premier Huong's government is now in serious difficulty.

The imposition of marshal law in the wake of continuing student rioting in Saigon may momentarily damp down the situation. Thus far the military have backed up the security measures. However, various civilian pressures on Chief of State Phan Khac Suu and on the High National Council to force Huong's resignation are mounting.

Tam Chau, head of the powerful Buddhist secular institute, has sent a letter to Suu and the council which in effect recommends that Huong be dismissed. Implicit in the letter is the threat of more serious demonstrations if this action is not carried out.

The letter was reportedly approved by the entire Buddhist hierarchy except Tri Quang, then out of Saigon. There are indications that Quang, the most influential of the Buddhist leaders, may now be disposed to support efforts to topple the government.

Chief of State Suu, while initially irritated over Huong's failure to consult with him over his cabinet selections, has thus far sought to stay out of the conflict between the premier and his opponents. However, he is now reported to have given up hope that Huong can gain support, and to be actively considering who might replace him.

25X1

25X1

Communist World: Peiping reaffirmed its general support for North Vietnam just prior to Ambassador Taylor's departure for Washington.

In a message to an international front conference which opened in Hanoi on 25 November, Premier Chou En-lai reiterated Peiping's earlier pledge that the Chinese would "not stand idly by" in the event of a US attack on North Vietnam. People's Daily on 25 November recalled that "the Chinese Government and people have also clearly indicated more than once that an attack on the DRV is an attack on China," but did not specify what constituted an "attack."

Peiping had earlier taken public notice of US press reports that Ambassador Taylor was returning to help decide "whether the US should step up its war efforts in South Vietnam, or agree to enlarge the war to North Vietnam."

In this context, Peiping's repetition of its open-ended "promise" to back Hanoi against US "aggression" is no doubt an attempt to deter the US from expanding the war in South Vietnam into North Vietnam. Chou declared that the US faces an impasse in South Vietnam and an expansion of the war "will only end up in a total and disgraceful fiasco."

\*Moscow has also issued an official declaration aimed at curbing any US extension of the war. A TASS statement yesterday, pegged to the incident of 18 November when US military planes allegedly intruded into North Vietnamese airspace, warned that "the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a fraternal socialist country and is prepared to give it the necessary assistance." The statement is couched in more specific terms than the vague pledges the Soviets offered in the course of the Tonkin Gulf incidents last August and September.

25X1

25X1

25X1

27 Nov 64

DAILY BRIEF

4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

25X1

NOTES

25X1

United Nations: The US Mission in New York anticipates some slippage in the current estimate that a resolution to seat Communist China in place of Taiwan in the UN would fall one vote short of a simple majority. If a vote is taken two months from now the mission expects Peiping to receive a simple majority.

25X1

25X1

USSR: Production of consumer goods will evidently be stepped up under the Soviet economic plan for 1965. Moscow radio's report of a speech by state planning chief Lomako on 20 November stated that "the ratio in the development rate of heavy and light industry will change in favor of light industry." Lomako apparently meant that the gap between the rates of increase of the two is to be narrowed by accelerating the rate of increase in consumer goods production more than in other economic fields.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

\*Cuba: [Rumors are circulating in Havana that Cuban leaders are facing a political crisis and that Fidel Castro's position is in jeopardy. The trouble is said to stem from an alleged plot on the part of "old guard" Cuban Communists to take over leadership of the regime from Castro and his neo-Communist followers. Castro's suspension of "old" Communist leader Joaquin Ordoqui on 18 November from his party and government posts may have given rise to these rumors.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

27 Nov 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

**THE PRESIDENT**

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/11 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008000210001-9

Approved For Release 2004/04/14 : PM : RPT-9T00975A008000210001-9  
**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/04/14 : PM : RPT-9T00975A008000210001-9  
**TOP SECRET**